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Preface: Turkey’s Accession to the EU – 
The Business Case
Rt Hon David Miliband MP, Foreign Secretary
With annual growth rates of  7.5% over the last five years, Turkey’s
economy has been the envy of  many EU Member States. Turkish
people have felt the benefits, with per capita income having doubled
since 2003. Add to the picture a young, well-educated population, the
importance of  Turkey to our energy security, and its success as a
democratic majority-Muslim state and the conclusion is clear: we have
in Turkey a partner of  immense promise.
EU Member States have already reaped the benefits that flow 
from ever closer ties with Turkey. European businesses have 
been quick to capitalise on impressive growth: EU-Turkey trade 
has more than doubled since the Customs Union came into force in
1996. In foreign policy, too, Turkey and the EU have developed real
synergies: Turkey has supported the EU’s Common Foreign and
Security Policy, Turkish troops serve alongside EU countries in
Afghanistan, and it was Turkey who provided the heavy lift capability to
allow French troops to deploy with EUFOR in the Democratic Republic
of  Congo.
The prospect of  EU membership has helped galvanise the reformers
in Turkish politics. The decade from 1995 to 2005 – which some call
Turkey’s ‘golden age’ of  reform – saw improvements in human rights,
civil liberties, governance, religious tolerance and increasing economic
liberalisation. This reform trajectory is likely to continue as long as the
EU membership perspective feels real.
Turkey’s accession negotiations have been ongoing since 2005. There
are challenges to be met, of  course; deepening democratic stability is
one, responding to the recent global financial shocks another. And
Turkey is the first to acknowledge that there is much more to do before
it is ready for membership. But the EU’s relationship with Turkey is
based on an interdependence that is both geostrategic and economic
5
so a loss of  momentum is in no-one’s interests. This study clearly
makes the business case for keeping the EU’s door wide open. It
deserves to be read.
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Preface
Rt Hon William Hague MP, Shadow Foreign Secretary
Turkey’s journey towards EU membership has been exceptional: no
country has had to sit longer in the EU’s waiting room. In every other
accession process the opening of  proper accession negotiations put
to bed the question of  whether the applicant state would ever be
allowed to join. Yet the debate on Turkish membership is regrettably
still far from settled in some Member States.
This debate is usually framed in geopolitical terms and around the
politics of  identity. Those are, indeed, the central issues EU countries
have to consider as they ponder an enlargement that would
unquestionably expand the EU beyond Europe’s geographical borders
as traditionally understood. However, as this collection of  fascinating
and highly topical essays shows, they should not obscure the
significant mutual economic benefits Turkey’s entry to the European
Union would bring, nor the importance of  having Turkey as a vital
energy hub within the European Union.
Energy security is the subject of  the day, and impossible to ignore after
the Georgian crisis. The role Turkey can play in helping EU member
states secure their supplies is crucial and the alternative if  Turkey had
less reason to think well of  EU nations should be considered very
seriously.
It is worth stating briefly the Conservative Party’s view of  why the
political case for Turkish EU membership is so strong.
There are signs that the length of  Turkey’s wait for EU members to
deal with their qualms may be wearing down her patience. It is
important to remind those who already enjoy the benefits of  EU
membership how fundamental Turkey’s EU membership is to the
European Union’s future and what Europe stands to lose by rejecting
it.
For the European Union it is a question of  Europe’s orientation, of  its
relationship with the Muslim world and even of  what it means to be
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European. If  the European Union rejects Turkey it would be a
statement that the Union’s future is inward-looking, fearful of  the world
beyond its borders. It would confine Europe’s ambitions to the
maintenance of  a small but perfect garden where the European social
model, whatever that may mean, could be cultivated in peace. With
the rise of  new economic giants Europe’s relative weight in the world
is shrinking. Hoping to build a fortress Europe would be a very
dangerous ambition for countries that need to make a living in a
globalised world.
Worse, some would inevitably take such a decision as a sign that the
European Union was, at bottom, an exclusively Christian club. In this
future European Union there might be room for a couple of  small
countries with Muslim ties – Bosnia, Albania and Kosovo – yet Turkey’s
rejection would likely be read as meaning that the EU saw the
membership of  any large Muslim nation as a threat to European
identity. This would not only damage Europe’s relations with her
Muslim neighbours but send a dangerous message to our own Muslim
citizens.
Most fundamentally of  all, Turkey’s rejection would mean that the
European Union had chosen for itself  a definition based on geography
and a narrow view of  historical identity, not shared values. The
European project was founded with a mission to root permanently
Europe’s highest ideals – friendship between nations, freedom,
democracy and the rule of  law – in the European political landscape
and make a return to the horrors of  totalitarianism and war impossible.
It is that mission and the enriching of  those peoples that have pursued
it that has made the European project such a powerfully attractive force
to so many societies with such a positive and transformative effect.
There could be no stronger statement that those ideals do not cease
to be relevant beyond the geographers’ Europe than Turkey’s inclusion
in the European Union.
If  the dangers of  rejecting Turkey should be clear to EU members the
benefits are as obvious as they are dramatic. As has been widely said,
Turkey can be a bridge between Europe and the wider Muslim world.
Given that so many of  the problems we face originate in the Middle
East, Europeans would be foolish not to avail ourselves of  so effective
8
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an interlocutor, not least with Iran. Turkey’s cultural ties with Central
Asia will also become increasingly important. A European Union with
Turkey as a member could not but help actively engage with the world
beyond Europe’s borders.
A very great deal has been written about the alleged clash of
civilisations between the Muslim world and the West. Turkish
membership of  the EU would instantly and decisively prove the Muslim
and Western are not mutually exclusive categories. The presence of
a large democratic, secular, Muslim country in the EU would not only
assure Muslim citizens of  EU countries of  their place in Europe but
provide a model of  potentially enormous significance to the wider
Muslim world.
The prospect of  Turkish accession has already produced international
gains. It has provided a highly constructive context for talks on the re-
unification of  Cyprus, without which the Annan plan’s rejection might
have proved fatal. What may be the beginnings of  the normalisation of
relations between Turkey and Armenia has certainly been eased by
Turkey’s European aspirations.
So there are the very weightiest reasons why any supporter of  the
European Union should want Turkey as a member.
What, then, is in it for Turkey? Anyone wondering about the economic
benefits will find themselves enlightened by the experts the Foreign
Policy Centre has assembled for this publication. On the political
benefits Turkish citizens are, of  course, best placed to set out that
argument. An outsider may only offer his view. It is my view that, in
common with other accession states, a Turkey that fully met the EU’s
accession criteria would be in every way a stronger society with the
systems of  governance that will be indispensible in succeeding in the
twenty first century. Since Ataturk fathered modern Turkey the course
of  modernity has not always run smoothly. There is every evidence
that, as elsewhere, EU membership would ease the path of  progress.
It will be no surprise to the reader, then, that the Conservative Party
would be as strong a supporter of  Turkey’s European ambitions in
government as we have been in opposition. A Conservative
9
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Government’s support would be all the more effective for representing
continuity in British policy: enlargement generally and Turkey in
particular is one area of  EU policy where there is an unusual cross
party consensus.
We acknowledge that there will be thorny issues. We must ensure that
the accession criteria are judged with no prejudice against Turkey but
also rigorously. The free movement of  workers is a matter that will have
to be handled with great care, with proper regard to the rights that are
due to every EU member and the potential economic impact of  free
movement within a Union of  wide economic disparities. The Common
Agricultural Policy and regional funding are likely to need further
changes if  the EU’s budget is to cope with what would be a big
enlargement. Member states will also naturally want to see a
settlement in Cyprus in place as well.
Turkey will be the largest single country to have joined the EU since the
United Kingdom, and that too will be an issue. Despite its dynamic
economy it is probable that Turkey will take its seat at the European
table combining a large and growing population with a GDP per head
below the European average. That may create some understandable
wariness in some EU partners and is one reason why the Conservative
Party is highly sceptical of  the Lisbon Treaty’s vote weighting system
in Council. The Nice Treaty’s more flexible system is better designed
for such an entry.
Yet with a modicum of  good will, political determination and intellectual
application all these issues can be dealt with. The European Union’s
enlargement has been and continues to be the most ambitious
international project in structured co-operation of  our century. Its
political and economic success has been astounding. This pamphlet
powerfully adds to the case for Turkey’s inclusion in that project. So I
am delighted to commend these thoughtful and informative
contributions to anyone interested in a subject so important to the
future of  many nations.
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Introduction: Turkey’s future lies in Europe
Adam Hug
Turkey is central to the future development of  the European Union.
The eventual decision by the existing EU member states to accept or
reject Turkey will have significant ramifications for the type of
organisation it will become. Put crudely, Turkish membership will signify
a choice for Europe between becoming an outward-looking union at
peace with its internal diversity that prioritises the economic and
security needs of  its members, or an insular, almost parochial
grouping, searching for an imagined cultural homogeneity.
This pamphlet argues that to win the debate in favour of  Turkish
membership, we have to clearly lay out the practical arguments
showing how both the EU and Turkey would be more prosperous and
secure if  accession is successful. It draws together the thoughts of
leading politicians, academics and business people from Britain and
Turkey, each of whom highlight the challenges and opportunities posed
by the accession process.
Several contributors to this pamphlet have described Turkish
membership as a ‘win-win’ or even a ‘win-win-win’ situation, but it is
clear that victory will be hard fought. The depressing facts are that the
majority of  European public opinion opposes Turkish membership and
leading politicians in member states including France, Germany and
Austria have publicly stated that they do not see Turkey as a future
member of  the Union.
President Sarkozy has publicly stated ‘that Europe must give itself
borders, that not all countries have a vocation to become members of
Europe, beginning with Turkey which has no place inside the European
Union.’1 Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) was
elected in 2005 on a pledge to block Turkish accession, but the
challenges of  coalition government and diplomatic pressure have
tempered her objections to the progress of  accession negotiations.
11
1 http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=159133
Both leaders have pushed for a nebulous ‘privileged partnership’, with
Sarkozy seeing Turkey playing a key role in his pet project, the Union
for the Mediterranean. Fears over Turkey played a role in the significant
gains made by the far right in the recent Austrian general election.
A consistent majority of  Europeans polled by the official Eurostat
survey are opposed to Turkish membership. The 2006 Attitudes
towards European Union Enlargement special survey showed that
‘according to the present public opinion in the European Union, of  all
the candidate and potential candidate countries, Turkey’s accession
generates the most disapproval. Only 39% of those polled are in favour
of  Turkish entry to the EU with 48% opposed even if  it complies with
all conditions set by the EU.’ 2
The Eurostat poll shows that, unsurprisingly, Austria (81%), Germany
(69%), Cyprus (68%) and Greece (67%) have large majorities against
Turkey joining the EU. The United Kingdom is one of  a smaller group
of  countries with a small majority of  people, 42% to 39%, in favour of
Turkish accession. As important as public opinion, is the vocal support
the Turkish case receives from all major political parties, as
demonstrated by the contributions from Rt Hon David Miliband MP and
Rt Hon William Hague MP to this pamphlet.
The majority of  EU citizens interviewed (52%) see the accession of
Turkey as mainly in the interest of  the country itself, 20% would see a
mutual interest to both the EU and Turkey for its entry in the European
Union and 7% see it as primarily being in the EU’s interest.3 However,
when Turks are asked the same question, more believe Turkish
membership is in the EU’s interest (34%) than in the mutual interest
(30%), or primarily in Turkey’s interest (13%).
Turkish support for membership has waned in recent years, in part as
a result of  the sluggish progress of  the accession process, but also as
a result of  the public opposition of  some EU leaders as already
mentioned. Polling conducted by A&G Aras¸tırma has shown that the
proportion of  Turks who definitely supported EU accession peaked in
12
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2 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_255_en.pdf
3 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_255_en.pdf
2004 at 67.5%, before slumping to 30.1% in January 2008. However,
its poll in April 2008 found an increase in support for the EU with 41.9%
of Turks believing that Turkey “should definitely” join.4 These findings
are consistent with the June 2008 Eurostat survey that found 58% of
Turks believing that Turkey would benefit from membership of  the EU,
up 5% on its previous poll.5 The A&G research showed that support for
EU membership increased most amongst supporters of  the AK party,
perhaps as a result of  the EU’s support for the Government around
the court case that decided its future earlier this year.
The challenge set before advocates of  Turkish membership then, is to
transform a climate of  cynicism and opposition that afflicts both the
European public and political elites, to ensure membership is granted
once Turkey meets the strict criteria required for entry. The price of
failure will be severe. As Foreign Policy Centre Director Stephen Twigg
argued in 2005, ‘history will not judge us kindly if  we fail to treat Turkey
with respect, and in so doing signal to our own ethnic minorities that we
have little faith in their capacity to integrate, or of  others to follow them.
Translated from political rhetoric into social reality, privileged
partnership is a shabby offer to make to millions of  Turks that already
live in Europe. What will future generations say about us if  we turn our
backs now, with so much at stake, and so much to gain, on the best
Muslim friend we have?’6
We must challenge the perception of  Europe as a ‘Christian Club’,
implied by such figures as former French President and President of
Convention on the Convention the future of  Europe Valerie Giscard
D’Estaing who said that Turkish membership ‘would be the end of
Europe’ and was advocated by ‘adversaries of  the European Union’7.
This will require a sustained application of  rational argument. Although
out of  touch with the reality of  many culturally and religiously diverse
member states, and drawing on a narrow view of  Europe’s complex
history, this negative perception appeals to a strain of  insularity and
13
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4 http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2372963
5 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb69/eb_69_first_en.pdf
6 Turks in Europe: Why are we afraid? Stephen Twigg in Schaefer, Austin and Parker,
Foreign Policy Centre, September 2005
7 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2420697.stm
zenophobia that may grow comforting in these challenging economic
times. That is why this pamphlet makes the case that Turkey’s future
is in Europe and that its membership would significantly strengthen
the EU’s security and prosperity. As Commissioner Rehn has said
previously, ‘if  we succeed, if  Turkey succeeds (in becoming a member
of  the EU), Turkey can become an even more important bridge of
civilizations than it is today.’8
The case for membership
Turkey has been at the heart of  European security since the Cold War,
joining NATO in 1952 and guarding Europe’s south eastern flank
against the Soviet Union. Today it sits at the gateway to the Middle
East, the Caucasus and Central Asia, a key strategic player in all three
regions. As Dr Gareth Winrow explains in this pamphlet, the area
where Turkey can perhaps contribute most to European security in the
future is energy, where it is the key alternative transit route to Russia
for Caspian oil and gas and the swiftest option for Northern Iraqi crude.
Professor Erzan has also highlighted the issue of  migration, which has
both economic and security aspects. It is essential that Turkey and the
EU work together to manage migration, both from Turkey’s own
youthful population, and from neighbouring countries in the Caucasus,
Central Asia and the Middle East. Erzan argues that the economic
benefits of  Turkish membership may well lead to lower migrant flows
to the EU than would be the case if  Turkey remained outside, with
significant numbers moving to the EU illegally.
However this pamphlet’s primary focus is on the economics of
accession. Anyone visiting the newer EU member states in Eastern
Europe cannot help but notice the transformative effect that the
accession process and subsequent membership has had on their
economies and societies. Contributors to this pamphlet clearly argue
that the preparations for and the first steps of  the accession process
have already significantly strengthened the Turkish economy and that
the recent slowing of  economic reforms and Turkish pessimism over
the status of  the accession process are inextricably linked.
14
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8 http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,2557936,00.html
In addition to the accession-driven reform process that is significantly
affecting the Turkish economy, legal system, political life and institutions,
Turkey is already benefiting from membership of  the Customs Union
with the EU, which it joined at the end of  19959. Turkey is also receiving
EU Instrumental Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) of  €1.76 billion
between 2008 and 2010 to ‘support the stability of  institutions so as 
to guarantee fundamental rights and freedoms, democracy, the rule 
of  law, human rights and the respect for and protection of  minorities,
and promotion of  the EU-Turkey Civil Society Dialogue’.10
The key dynamics of  the economic relationship between Turkey and
the EU are clear. The EU is the market for 56% of  Turkish exports, ten
times that of  any other export destination11, while Turkey is the EU’s
fifth largest export market. European firms annually invest over €3
billion in Turkey12, and Turkey’s youthful population of  72 million, half
of  which are under 30, remains an important source of  migrant
workers who are able to ‘infill’ where there are European labour
shortages. After economic setbacks in 1994 and at the turn of  the
millennium, Turkey has grown at an average annual rate of  6.8% 13.
According to the World Bank, the political stability and economic
integration that eventual Turkish membership would provide should
boost its GDP per capita growth by 1.5% per year14, and allow it to
expand as a market for European goods.
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9 Some contributors have dated the customs union as starting in 1996. The Commission
notes the date as the 31st December 1995, a Sunday, so its implications will only have been felt in
1996. Readers can take their pick.
10 IP/08/1425 ‘Commission adopts multi-annual planning of financial assistance to the
Western Balkans and Turkey, European Commission, 29th September 2008
11 http://www.economist.com/countries/TURKEY/profile.cfm?folder=Profile-FactSheet
12 EU Trade 2006 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/turkey/index_en.htm
13 ‘Keeping the door wide open: Turkey and EU accession’, Business and Enterprise
Select Committee, June 2008 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/
cmberr/367/367i.pdf
14 Fadi Hakura, Chatham House http://www.icea.co.uk/archive/ICEA-%20The%20
Turkish%20EconomyPresentation-14February2006.ppt#280,28,Slide28
Areas of concern
As our contributors point out, the short to medium term outlook for the
Turkish economy is, like most of  the world in the current economic
climate, uncertain and with specific areas of  concern. The House of
Commons Business and Enterprise Select Committee produced an
important report in June 2008 entitled ‘Keeping the door wide open:
Turkey and EU accession’ which makes a strong case for Turkish
membership of  the EU. However, drawing upon a range of
submissions made to the Committee, it highlights several areas of
concern. It notes IMF and OECD projections prior to the autumn 2008
financial crisis that forecast real growth in Turkey falling, from 5.0% in
2007 to 4.0% in 2008, or even slightly below, before rising slightly to
around 4.5% in 2009. The report noted that, according to submissions
from officials at the Department for Business, Enterprise and
Regulatory Reform, Turkey’s trade balance was ‘worrying’ and its ‘large
current-account deficit and heavy reliance on short-term capital inflows
could leave the economy vulnerable to sharp changes in investor
sentiment’.
Like many other countries in recent times, Turkey has been struggling
with the inflationary pressures of  high food and fuel prices, exceeding
its inflation targets. Inflation year on year to May 2008 was running 
at nearly 11%, exceeding targets for the second year in a row, which
led the Governor of  the Central Bank to raise the target from 4% to
7.5%. However, these current difficulties must be considered in the
context of  inflationary rates of  65%, experienced as recently as 
the late 1990s.
There remain significant political challenges that Turkey must face up
to if  it is to be ready for membership. The ramifications of  the
attempted ‘judicial coup’ that took place early this year have yet to fully
dissipate. Prosecutors in Ankara came within a whisker of  removing
the current Justice and Development (AK) Government, elected only
a year previously with 46.6% of  the vote, on charges that focused on
moves to allow women to wear the hijab in universities. Although the
attempt to dissolve the AK party failed, the majority of  judges voted in
favour of  the dissolution, only failing to meet the required qualified
majority level needed by one vote. Had it succeeded, it would have
16
Turkey in Europe
dealt a hammer-blow to hopes of  Turkish membership in the
foreseeable future. The keepers of  Turkey’s secularist traditions must
adapt to the basic requirements of  democracy and respect for human
rights that form the fundamental core of  EU membership, and see
Atatürk’s vision of  a modern, Europeanised Turkey be realised within
the EU.
Despite recent progress, including legal changes to enhance
compliance with EU norms, restrictions on freedom of  speech and the
press remain in statute, including Article 301 of  the Turkish penal code,
under which a person who publicly denigrates the Turkish nation,
government, military, judiciary or other institutions can be jailed for up
to 2 years, as used to prosecute writers such as Orhan Pamuk. Such
restrictions are fundamentally incompatible with membership of  the EU
and are to the detriment of  Turkish democracy. However, in this and the
other main challenges Turkey faces, it is the rigorous criteria provided
by the EU accession process that will be an immense force for change.
According to the International Crisis Group, ‘the golden years of  the
EU accession process, 2001-2004, had a striking impact in calming
the relationship between the government and Turkish Kurds.’15
However, it is essential that there is continued progress on legal
reforms and that changes are clearly implemented on the ground. The
Kurdish Human Rights project highlighted continuing concerns over
language rights, noting that students remain unable to be taught the
Kurdish language in state schools, that local and regional governments
are prevented from using Kurdish in the provision of  services and the
language cannot be used in election campaigns.16 Furthermore, there
has been a notable upsurge in clashes between the Turkish Army and
the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in 2008, both in Turkey’s Kurdish
regions and in incursions into Northern Iraq. Turkey will need further
support from the EU in tackling the PKK, but the fight against terrorism
must not obscure the need to continue to improve conditions on the
ground for Turkish Kurds. Full protection of  minority rights must remain
a key condition of  Turkish accession.
17
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16 In conversation with KHRP Turkey and Iraq Desk Officer Mustafa Gundogu
Our contributors
This pamphlet has brought together some of  the leading politicians,
academics and business people from the UK, Turkey and the
European Commission to set out the key challenges that lie ahead in
the Turkish accession process, and to make the case in favour of
membership.
As Rt Hon William Hague MP and Rt Hon David Miliband MP have
shown in their prefaces, there is considerable political support for
Turkish membership in British political circles. Their sentiments are
echoed in the following pages by Commissioner Olli Rehn, who has
long been a vocal advocate of  Turkish membership in his role as
Enlargement Commissioner. He provides an overview of  benefits of
the current Customs Union and the economic linkages European
companies have made with Turkey. He argues that liberalisation of
services and public procurement achieved by accession would ‘provide
new opportunities to EU companies and help generate growth and
jobs in Europe’ and that this needs to feature more prominently in the
public debate around Turkish accession. He says that the EU is
‘committed to the (accession) process’ and he looks forward to opening
new negotiations on the new chapters of  the process later this year.
However, the Commissioner also believes that Turkey needs to do
more in order to open new chapters, noting the delays to reforming
state aid that have blocked opening the competition policy chapter, and
similar action needed to open chapters on taxation, social policy and
employment. He believes ‘a determined and steady effort towards
reforms remains the most effective way to convince the EU’s citizens
that Turkey’s membership will be a win-win operation’.
Dr Mehmet Ugur sounds a note of  caution, arguing that the
impressive commitment to economic and institutional reform shown by
the AK Government during the early years of  its first term, 2002-2005,
has not been matched in later years. He believes that it is the stalling
of  reform, as well as the turbulence in the global markets, that is
behind the lower rates of  growth, higher inflation and interest rates in
the Turkish economy. He argues if  the virtuous cycle of  reform,
economic growth and progress towards accession is undermined by a
weakened commitment to deliver reform or EU membership, it could
18
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undermine the economy and strengthen opponents of  Turkish
membership in Turkey and the EU. If  Turkey is denied membership Dr
Ugur believes the EU would face uncertainty and risk areas including
trade, financial flows, energy and migration with co-operation limited or
non-existent in the wake of  rejection. The short-term political
opportunism in both Turkey and some EU member states is creating
a period of  ‘engineered uncertainty’ that will harm the long-term
interest of  both.
Professor Refik Erzan argues that were the prospect of  EU
accession to be taken off  the table, the existing terms of  the Customs
Union might come under threat, as Turkey must abide by the EU’s
preferential trade deals without reciprocity from the third party
countries. He points out that Turkey has a key role to play in Sarkozy’s
Med Union, one that is contingent on continued progress towards
accession. As previously mentioned, he argues that ‘if  Turkey loses
the membership perspective, the EU may end up having more
immigrants than it would under a free movement of  labour regime with
a prosperous EU member Turkey’.
Dr Bahadir Kaleagasi, representing the Turkish Industrialists and
Businessman’s Association TUSIAD, describes the accession process
as a ‘long and narrow road’. He argues that the Turkish public is more
aware of  European politicians making negative noises about Turkish
membership than the positive ones, and combined with the failure to
reach a resolution over Cyprus, this has severely undermined the
previously dominant pro-European voices in Turkey. Kaleagasi sees
Turkish membership giving the EU greater access to a key emerging
market, acting as a net generator of  jobs in the major EU economies,
enhancing energy security, reinforcing the Lisbon agenda, helping de-
bunk the ‘Clash of  Civilisations’ narrative, and strengthening the EU’s
internal security against the challenges of  organised crime, illegal
immigration and terrorism from the Middle East, Russia and Central
Asia. He sees the key challenges for the Turkish government and
business community as including delivering greater democratic
stability, public service reform, reducing the informal economy,
boosting agricultural productivity and comprehensive education reform.
He believes economic growth should enable Turkey to be ready for EU
membership between 2015 and 2017.
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Sir Julian Horn-Smith believes there are enormous opportunities for
increasing UK trade and investment in Turkey, many of which are linked
to the accession process. He welcomes the commitment of  the Turkish
government and the new Turkish Investment Support and Promotion
Agency to supporting investors and believes the UK can help Turkey
in areas including corporate governance, regulatory frameworks and
public/private partnerships. He is convinced that the accession process
is a ‘win-win’ situation for European business.
Chairman of  our partners Business for New Europe, Roland Rudd
notes that polling conducted for his organisation showed 67% of British
business leaders supported Turkish accession on meeting the
accession criteria, with only 22% opposing the idea. He points out that
there were many who opposed the idea of  the EU’s eastward
expansion in 2004, only to be proved wrong by its success. He praised
the growth in FDI in Turkey from $1 billion in 2004 to $20 billion in 2006,
including the investment made by the 450 British businesses with a
presence in Turkey, and highlighted Turkey’s important role in EU
energy security.
Dr Gareth Winrow focuses on Turkey’s ability to strengthen the EU’s
energy security, arguing that Turkey can be a crucially important
energy hub for new routes of  oil and gas bypassing Russia. He notes
Turkey’s proximity to 72% of  the world’s proven oil and gas reserves,
the moves underway to develop the key port of  Ceyhan and the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline that has operated since 2006. He
examines the centrality of  Turkey to the success or failure of  the
Nabucco gas pipeline and notes that Turkey’s plans to receive gas from
the pipeline at a low cost which it could then resell to European
markets at a higher cost would contravene the principle of  the energy
acquis. He believes Turkish diplomacy may be critical to the viability of
Nabucco by ensuring Turkmen and Azeri participation in the scheme,
providing the volumes of  gas required to make it viable.
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Turkey’s economic integration with the EU: 
A case of win-win interdependence
European Commissioner Olli Rehn
When the EU opened accession negotiations with Turkey in 2005, it
was the culmination of  many decades of  progressive economic
integration. The start of  negotiations was also a recognition of  the
growing interdependence that benefits both sides.
The EU signed an Association Agreement with Turkey in 1963. The
Customs Union between the EU and Turkey established at the end of
1995 then aimed to deepen trade and economic relations. The
Customs Union is an essential part of  our bilateral relations, as it has
created a large integrated market where common standards for goods
apply in many sectors.
Implementation of  the Customs Union has caused a qualitative and
quantitative jump in the integration of  our economies. Since its
establishment, trade between the EU and Turkey has almost tripled as
European and Turkish companies took advantage of  this large,
integrated market. The EU has become an important and stable
market for Turkish exporters.
Through setting up cross-border networks, the business community
has given substance to the enlargement process. EU-Turkey trade has
reached almost €100 billion in 2007 and continues to grow. The EU is
now by far the most important trade partner of  Turkey and Turkey is the
seventh biggest trade partner of  the EU. About half  of  Turkey’s trade
is with the EU.
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from the EU into Turkey has increased
sharply in recent years, rising from about €450 million in 2003 to almost
€9 billion in 2007 – a twenty-fold increase. More specifically, FDI
inflows grew from an average of  0.5% of GDP in the 1990-2004 period
to about 3.5% of GDP in 2006-2007 and they were sufficient to finance
the current account deficit. EU FDI in Turkey represents around two-
thirds of  total FDI inflows in the last six years.
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Mergers and acquisitions involving EU and Turkish companies 
have increased dramatically. Major European companies have long-
standing and well-established trade relations with Turkish partners in
all sectors of  the economy. Some examples are Renault, FIAT,
Siemens, Bosch, Nokia, Carrefour, Metro, Fortis, HSBC – but there are
many others.
At the same time, Turkish companies are becoming all the more active
in the EU; for example, there was the acquisition of  Godiva chocolates
by the Uelker group and the acquisition of  Bloomberg and Grundig in
Germany by the Turkish Koç group.
The EU’s relationship with Turkey today
The EU shares numerous interests with Turkey. Turkey is a partner of
key strategic importance for all European citizens, in terms of  security,
stability, prosperity and energy supply. The recent crisis in the
Caucasus has highlighted once again Turkey’s strategic potential for
the secure and regular supply of  hydrocarbons to the EU. Turkey is
and remains the only serious alternative route for our energy supply. It
is now high time to move on with projects such as the Nabucco
pipeline, which is in both the EU and Turkey’s interest.
The Commission is encouraging Turkey to engage seriously in the
discussions in view of  making Nabucco operational as of  2013. Too
much time has already been wasted when we urgently need to ensure
future energy security for both the EU and Turkey. Let me also renew
once more the European Union’s standing invitation to Turkey to join
the European Energy Community, which offers concrete benefits to
the whole of  Europe in linking up the infrastructure that will ensure our
future energy security.
Turkey’s assets for the EU are numerous. It is the 15th biggest economy
in the world with a GDP of  about €424 billion and a huge market of  71
million people. Turkey is a big export-oriented emerging industrial
economy and a rapidly developing information society. It is, for
example, the biggest manufacturer of  TV sets and buses in Europe,
the third steel producer and has an internationally competitive
automotive industry.
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Turkey has a young and dynamic workforce – the average age of  the
population is 28 years. Located at the crossroads of  Europe and Asia,
with good connections with the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Middle
East, Russia and Central Asia, Turkey can help the EU develop
relations with other important markets and regions.
The liberalisation of  services and public procurement – which are not
covered by the Customs Union – would provide new opportunities to
EU companies and help generate growth and jobs in Europe. Turkey
has already become a key element of  Europe’s competitiveness in the
global economy. However, these elements do not feature often enough
in the public debate in the EU about Turkey’s accession process.
At the same time, the EU is a strategic asset for Turkey as well. With
its internal market of  more than 500 million people, regulated by a solid
system of  common rules and standards which provide for a
transparent and level playing field, the European Union is a huge
market and an anchor for reform, modernisation and stabilisation of
the Turkish economy. It is also the right channel for further integration
of the Turkish economy in global markets, the global economic system,
and a source of  prosperity.
Deeper economic integration of  Turkey in the EU should be a joint
objective. Such integration will make both sides stronger. The
accession negotiations offer the best instrument for this purpose as
they help to ensure a level playing field and a society where the rule
of  law applies. The deeper economic integration of  our relations is a
challenge and a source of  strength at the same time.
Progress in accession negotiations
The EU accession process is ongoing despite obstacles. We are
committed to the process and we are honouring our commitment. We
expect the same from Turkey. So far we have opened negotiations on
eight policy areas (called “chapters” in EU parlance) and we look
forward to opening new ones later this year under the French
Presidency. A number of  other chapters could also be opened if  Turkey
meets the relevant conditions set by the EU – the “opening
benchmarks”.
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Turkey has been working with uneven energy to address them. For the
first time last June, Turkey managed to meet the opening benchmarks
for two chapters – Intellectual Property Law and Company Law – and
negotiations were thus opened on these two very important areas. For
these chapters, Turkey now needs to implement the relevant action
plans and meet the commitments it has undertaken.
But Turkey needs to do more in order to open new chapters. The core
principle of  the accession process is that progress in the negotiations
follows progress of  reforms in the candidate country. The accession
process therefore takes place first and foremost in Turkey rather than
in Brussels.
An example is the chapter on competition policy. One of  the
benchmarks for the opening of  this chapter is the establishment of  a
truly independent, functioning state aid monitoring and enforcing
authority which will ensure that state subsidies do not distort
competition in the market. And yet, the draft law on state aids, which
would create such an authority, has been blocked for years in Turkey.
A draft law, containing all the essential elements required by the
acquis, recently left the office of  the Prime Minister to go to the
Parliament. The Commission hopes that the Turkish Grand National
Assembly will swiftly adopt a State Aid Law in line with the Customs
Union requirements.
There are other important chapters where Turkey needs to make the
necessary efforts to meet the opening benchmarks. Important
examples are taxation, social policy and employment – for which
Turkey needs to adopt a law on trade unions which respects ILO
standards. On environment, Turkey needs to adopt an Action Plan of
alignment with the acquis.
Action on these chapters is needed now if  we are to maintain a steady
momentum in the accession negotiations. In this respect, I also count
on the Turkish business community, which has a crucial role to play. It
can encourage the government to make the necessary progress and
meet the relevant conditions.
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As in all previous enlargement negotiations, the Commission is there
to help Turkey in its efforts. In addition to our strong political ties with
Turkey, we are supporting the process through a substantial and
comprehensive pre-accession financial assistance, currently the
biggest of  the EU to a non-Member State, totalling €4 billion in 
the period 2007-2012, having started at around €500 million in 2007.
The aim of  this assistance is to help the Turkish authorities integrate
and become acquainted with the EU legislation, standards and rules
and thus ensure fulfilment of  the accession criteria.
Conclusion
The opening of  Turkey’s accession negotiations with the EU three
years ago created confidence inside and outside Turkey and promoted
trade and FDI. A revitalisation of  Turkey’s long-awaited reforms to
accelerate the country’s democratic and economic transformation will
contribute to the furthering of  our business and economic ties and 
will attract even more investment.
Continuation of  structural reforms is of  vital importance in order to
ensure the sustainability of  economic gains achieved in recent years
and to shield the economy from the shock of  the financial crisis. We
want to see Turkey focus with determination on its European journey,
with a clear sense of  direction and a quicker pace.
Turkey is not undertaking the reforms just for the sake of  joining the
Union. Rather, preparing for future membership means creating new
opportunities for citizens in a more open society, enhancing prosperity,
strengthening stability, and alleviating global and regional tensions.
As European Commissioner responsible for enlargement, I have faith
in this process resulting in success and bringing benefits for all.
However, it is mainly Turkey who holds the keys to this process. I
personally believe that a determined and steady effort towards reforms
remains the most effective way to convince the EU’s citizens that
Turkey’s membership will be a win-win operation.
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The Turkish Economy and the EU Connection: The
case for moving beyond engineered uncertainty
Dr Mehmet Ugur
Introduction
The Justice and Development Party (AKP) recorded a stunning
election victory in 2002 by differentiating itself  from the old guard
through an explicit commitment to better economic governance and
extensive reforms in the context of  EU conditionality. The commitment,
so long as it was credible, has paid handsome dividends for the party
and the country: the AKP has won two further elections (the local
elections of  2004 and the general elections of  2007) with increased
support; and the Turkish economy grew at rates of  five percent or
higher each year from 2002 to 2007.
The AKP government must be congratulated for creating a virtuous
cycle of  reform and economic growth from 2002-2005 by aligning itself
with the twin conditionality of  the IMF and the EU. Nevertheless, after
2005, this virtuous cycle has come under significant pressures –
originating from both domestic and international sources. This article
will first provide a summary of  what has been achieved. It will then
elaborate on the relationship between Turkey’s economic performance
and the credibility of  the government’s reform commitments in the
context of  the accession process. Finally, it will demonstrate that
weakened commitment to reforms and EU membership may cause the
virtuous cycle to unravel – leading to less impressive economic
performance in Turkey and strengthening the hands of  Turkey-sceptic
politicians, as well as public opinion in the EU.
Growth and stability at last . . .
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Turkish economic policy
framework was conducive to populism and rent-seeking* behaviour.
26
* To explain to non economists, rent seeking is when an individual, organization or firm
seeks to make money by manipulating the economic and/or legal environment rather than by trade
and production of wealth.
As a result, Turkey’s macro-economic performance has deteriorated
overtime and the prospect of  EU membership has become
increasingly elusive (Ugur, 2004). Average growth rates have declined
from 4.76% in the 1970s to 3.93% in the 1990s; whereas the
coefficient of  variation of  GDP growth (a measure of  volatility) has
increased from 51% over the same period.
There is significant evidence indicating that GDP growth volatility is
caused by weak institutional quality and that such volatility (either by
itself  or in combination with weak institutional quality) is conducive to
lower per-capita GDP growth (Hnatkovska and Loayza, 2005; IMF,
2003; Rodrik et al, 2004). In the light of  such findings, it would not be
off-the-mark to describe the 1990s as a lost decade for economic
development in Turkey.
To its credit, the AKP campaigned for the 2002 elections on the basis
of  a pro-EU, pro-reform and pro-stability platform. Its economic policy
was essentially in congruence with the newly-established IMF-
sponsored stabilisation programme, which consisted of  fiscal
discipline, central bank independence, implicit inflation targeting,
flexible exchange rates, and extensive structural reforms ranging from
banking through corporate governance to public administration. In
addition, the party leader, Mr Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an, engaged in face-
to-face diplomacy with European leaders in order to assure them of his
personal commitment, as well as AKP’s determination, to maintain the
‘EU perspective’ as a policy priority.
Hence, three factors – IMF and EU conditionality; the explicit manner
in which the AKP government has committed to ‘own’ their
prescriptions; and the prospect for starting EU accession negotiations
by 2005 – have all combined to create a unique environment for
economic recovery and performance since 2002. As a result, the
rebounding that usually follows a deep recession such as that
experienced by Turkey 2001, was followed by sustained recovery and
high growth rates until 2007 (see table 1, section 1 below).
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Table 1: Basic Economic Indicators: Turkey 2001 – 2007
Section I 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007*
Real GNP growth rate (%) -9.5 7.9 5.9 9.9 7.6 5.9 5.0
CPI inflation (%) 68.5 29.7 18.4 9.4 7.7 9.7 8.4
Unemployment rate (%) 10.4 11.0 10.3 10.3 10.2 9.9 9.5
Average real 35.5 30.5 33.9 15.3 6.0 11.6 7.0
interest rate (%)
Section II
Public sector primary 5.5 5.1 6.2 7.2 6.8 6.6 6.7
balance (% of  GNP)
Interest payments 22.6 17.6 15.4 11.7 7.9 7.4 7.6
(% of  GNP)
Public sector balance -17.1 -12.5 -9.1 -4.6 -1.2 -0.8 -0.9
(% of  GNP)
Net debt of  public sector 90.4 78.4 70.3 64.0 55.3 44.8 41.0
(%of GNP)
Section III
Current account balance 2.4 -0.8 -3.4 -5.2 -6.3 -7.9 -7.3
(% of  GNP)
National saving rate 19.0 21.0 20.0 22.0 18.0 16.0 n.a.
(% of  GDP)
* = Estimate   Source: IMF (2007a) and http://www.hazine.gov.tr/stat/e-gosterge.htm
From 2002-2007, national income grew at an average annual rate of
approximately 7% and inflation fell from about 30% in 2002 to 7.7% in
2005, before increasing again to 9.7% in 2006. The government
delivered on its commitment to maintain a primary public sector surplus
(public sector balance excluding interest payments) of  approximately
6.5% – as envisaged under IMF conditionality. Thanks to sustained fiscal
discipline, high growth rates, and the appreciation of the Turkish Lira, the
ratio of  public debt to national income has fallen from around 78% in
2002 to 41% in 2007. Finally, as growth resumed and stability set in, the
cost of  disinflation (in terms of high real interest rates) began to fall.
The AKP government’s positive impact on growth and stability has two
sources. Fist, the AKP lent crucial support to a fledgling stabilisation
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process that had started only one year before the party assumed
power. The stabilisation programme that followed the February 2001
crisis was overseen by technocrats such as Mr Kemal Dervis¸ (who
was transferred from the World Bank to become Minister of  Economic
Affairs from May 2001 to August 2002) and a number of  key economic
policy actors such as the then Central Bank governor Mr Süreyya
Serdengeçti and a number of  senior Treasury staff. Without AKP
ownership, this stabilisation programme and the reform process it
triggered could have been derailed and a situation similar to the
aftermath of  the Argentine crisis may have developed in Turkey.
Another contribution that the AKP government should be credited for
was the priority it accorded to democratisation reforms in the context
of  EU-Turkey relations. Before the elections in November 2002, AKP
had campaigned on a pro-EU membership platform. Its campaign was
crucial in lending legitimacy to and fostering domestic ownership of
the democratisation reforms required under the Copenhagen criteria.
In addition, its reform efforts from 2002–2004 went a significant way
towards satisfying the conditions for the start of  accession negotiations
by the end of  2005. All major international organisations (the IMF, the
World Bank and the OECD, etc), as well as major international banks
and rating agencies welcomed the EU accession process as an anchor
for stability and sustained economic growth in Turkey. These upbeat
assessments have constituted positive signals that influenced the risk
assessments and decision-making of  international as well as domestic
investors in Turkey. These positive signals were made possible and
credible mainly because of  AKP government’s commitment to the EU
perspective as an anchor for policy reform.
The importance of governance quality and long time horizons
Although these contributions of  the AKP government are essentially
uncontroversial, there are mounting concerns that the AKP
government has begun to commit two types of  ‘sins’ – one in its
economic policy and one in its relations with the EU. The economic
policy ‘sin’ consisted of  over-selling the success while overlooking the
significance of  long-standing structural weaknesses of  the Turkish
economy. These weaknesses consisted of  historically high levels of
dependence on external finance and poor indicators of  economic
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governance and institutional quality. The second ‘sin’ is the shift, since
mid-2005, towards a shorter time horizon in its commitment to
‘Europeanisation’ reforms and EU perspective.
Deepening current account deficits and declining saving rates are two
major indicators of  structural vulnerabilities that the AKP government
tended to underestimate (Section III in Table 1 above). While the
current account deficits have increased from less than 1% of  GDP in
2002 to 7.3% in 2007, the national saving rate as a proportion of  GDP
has declined from 21% in 2002 to 16% in 2006. Both of  these trends
point to increased reliance on external finance and, as such, they point
to the risk of  vulnerability to adverse shifts in external financing
conditions (IMF, 2007b).
Of  course, Turkey’s dependence on external finance has its own
history and the AKP government’s economic policy cannot be held
solely responsible for its increasing severity. However, the AKP
government’s policy has also had an effect. The AKP government’s
success in reducing inflation has been obtained at the cost of  high real
interest rates, which led to over-valuation of  the Turkish currency and
deterioration in current accounts. In addition, the less than impressive
method employed by the AKP government in its appointment of  the
new Central Bank (CB) governor in 2006 led to some doubts about his
independence. As a result, the governor has had to sanction a series
of  interest rate hikes in order to assert his credibility (see Table 1
above).
The explicit inflation targeting regime had a bumpy start in 2006, with
evident failure to hit the target in 2006 and 2007 (see Table 2 below).
Not only did actual inflation turn out to be higher than target inflation,
the expected inflation at the beginning of  each of  those years was
higher than the actual as well as the target inflation rates. This
combination, coupled with increasing real interest rates, point to a
widening credibility gap (between actual and expected inflation) and an
increase in cost disinflation. Of  course, the failure to achieve the
inflation target in 2006 and 2007 was also related to developments
beyond the control of  the government: increased oil and food prices,
adverse capital movements and depreciation of  the Turkish currency
that occurred in the summer of  2006. However, the adverse effect of
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these external developments was exacerbated by the loss of  credibility
suffered by the Central Bank as a result of  the opacity with which the
government appointed its new governor.
Table 2: Inflation and real interest rates: Turkey 2002-2007
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Target inflation (%) 35 20 12 8 5 4
Actual inflation (%) 29.7 18.4 9.3 7.7 9.6 8.4
Expected inflation
(% at start of  year) 48.3 24.9 13.1 8.4 6.5 6.8
Actual – Target inflation (%) - 5.3 - 1.6 - 2.7 - 0.3 + 4.6 + 4.4
Actual – Expected inflation (%) -18.6 - 6.5 - 3.8 - 0.7 + 3.1 + 1.6
Source: http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/ and http://www.treasury.gov.tr/stat/e-gostergeeng.htm
One would be forgiven for treating these as one-off  errors of
judgement had they been not associated with what looks like a more
calculated change in the government’s approach to accession
negotiations with the EU. From 2005 onwards, the AKP’s commitment
to reform and EU membership began to falter for two observable
reasons. One reason was the negative signals from some member-
states such as France and Germany, which have been toying with the
idea of  ‘privileged partnership’ that falls short of  full membership.
Although one should treat this barren policy vision as proof  of  the
mediocrity that has inflicted European politics in the post-9/11 world,
it did have the expected effect of  weakening the AKP’s resolve and
strengthening the hands of  the Euro-sceptic Turkish groups that had
lost some influence from 2002-2005.
Yet, the unimaginative nature of  European politics may have been a
convenient excuse rather than a determining cause for the shift in the
AKP’s stance towards EU accession. There is evidence suggesting
that the AKP government has begun to discount the long-term benefits
of  Europeanisation reforms and EU membership more heavily from
mid-2005 onwards. Ironically, this shift happened soon after the victory
in the local elections of  2004, which should have been treated as
confirmation of  popular support for the AKP’s pro-reform and pro-EU
agenda. On the contrary, the AKP began to weaken its ownership of
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the Europeanisation reforms. Instead, it felt obliged to satisfy the
demands of  its conservative/religious core supporters concerning
issues such as the wearing of  the headscarf  in public places,
facilitating the access of  vocational religious school graduates to
higher education, and increasing the legitimacy of  religious
values/norms as reference points in the conduct of  social life.
It is important to note here that the AKP has always been known to be
sympathetic to these demands since its establishment, but it in fact
did not fight the 2002 elections with a manifesto that articulated these
demands. On the contrary, the election manifesto was coloured with
demands for democratisation reforms and closer integration with the
EU. Despite this, the AKP government demonstrated a clear change in
priorities in March 2005 – when it defended the violent intervention of
the police against women demonstrators and branded the critics of  the
heavy-handed tactics as ‘informing agents’ working for the Europeans!
Therefore, it is not surprising that the AKP has begun to distance itself
not only from the liberal-democratic forces (who are a vocal minority in
support of  closer integration with the EU), but also from TUSIAD (the
leading umbrella group of  large businesses in Turkey) whose pro-
reform and pro-EU commitment has proved longer-term compared to
that of  the AKP government.
The significance of  this policy shift lies not only in its undermining of
the credibility of  the reform commitment, but also in halting or reversing
the improvement in Turkey’s economic governance and institutional
structures. According to International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
ratings, Turkey has graduated from having a ‘high risk’ (a rating of  50-
59.5) to a ‘moderate risk’ (a rating of  60-69.5) status under the AKP
government. This is a significant improvement overall, but its
significance is dampened by a continuously low rating with respect to
corruption and bureaucratic quality. The government has direct control
over these indicators, but both have remained below the levels from
immediately before the crisis of  2001. (ICRG, 2006)
Another source of  information is the World Economic Forum’s Global
Competitiveness Index. Turkey’s score on this index has improved
slightly – from 3.86 in 2001 to 4.25 in 2007. However, this improvement
in the score was not associated with a significant improvement in the
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rank, which improved by only 1 point from the rank of  54 in 2001 to that
of  53 in 2007. Still another source of  information is the World Bank
governance indicators, according to which Turkey has recorded a
modest improvement in government effectiveness, but suffered a
modest deterioration in regulatory quality. In addition, the World Bank
indicators indicate that Turkey’s governance ratings in 2007 have been
lower than those of  central and Eastern European countries.
Such poor indicators of  governance and institutional quality have 
been associated with relatively poor indicators of  competitiveness 
too – especially with those over which the government can be expected
to have an influence. The competitiveness indicators in which 
Turkey scores less favourably than her overall rank would suggest
include: macroeconomic stability indicators, microeconomic efficiency
indicators and institutional quality indicators (see http://www.gcr.
weforum.org/). Of  course, one should not read too much into such
indicators, which tend to be endogenous to economic performance
itself. In other words, the indicators tend to improve during periods of
growth and they tend to deteriorate during periods of  crisis/recessions.
However, this endogeneity problem points to a more rather than less
serious shortcoming in AKP performance: the AKP government has
failed to secure improvement in governance and institutional quality
indicators despite the upward bias built into the indicators from 2002-
2007 when growth rates were high.
This is not surprising because, since 2005, the AKP government has
moved away from its manifesto commitments to cater for the demands
of  its core supporters, has begun to discount the benefits of  EU
accession more heavily, and has crowded the policy agenda with
issues that the party leadership consider necessary to counterbalance
the influence of  ‘nationalist’ opposition – within and outside the
parliament. Stated differently, the AKP government’s commitment to
reforms and EU accession has suffered a significant loss of  credibility–
irrespective of  what the government claims about its commitment to
these goals.
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Conclusions
As the World Bank (2006) has indicated, Turkey’s economic
performance since the 2000/2001 crisis has been ‘very strong’ and the
country has undertaken an extensive range of  reforms. The AKP
should be credited for lending credibility to the reform commitment and
for contributing to Turkey’s economic performance in terms of  growth
and stability. Also, the EU should be credited for managing the pre-
accession process from 1999-2004 effectively and for coming up with
an accession offer.
However, post-2005 developments tend to be less impressive on
several fronts and the virtuous cycle of: credible commitment –
extensive reform – strong economic performance, began to show signs
of  unravelling. Accession negotiations with the EU could have been
used as a platform for reversing this trend and encouraging ownership
of  institutional renewal in Turkey. However, neither the AKP
government nor the EU has risen to this challenge in a convincing
manner – with inevitable loss to both parties.
The loss to Turkey is already highlighted by TUSIAD, which is now
depicting a less than optimistic picture of  economic conditions in
Turkey. According to TUSIAD (2007), the Turkish economy is heading
towards lower rates of  growth, more difficulty in lowering inflation,
uncertainty in international markets, high interest rates, and
inadequate employment creation. Part of  the reason for these trends
lies outside Turkey, in the form of  increasing commodity prices and
ongoing financial turbulence. However, the other part can be related to
the AKP government’s failure to demonstrate a long-term commitment
to policy reform and institution-building in the context of  integration
with the EU. It is now more difficult to establish credibility, even if  the
government tries to revive the accession process as an anchor for
policy reform and institution-building. The ineffective attempts by the
Foreign Minister, Mr Ali Babacan, to resurrect the accession process
is due to the difficulty of  re-establishing credibility rather than personal
incompetence.
The loss to the EU may be less apparent, but it is by no means less
significant. A Turkey that is not firmly integrated within the EU will be
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a major source of  uncertainty and risk in areas ranging from trade
through financial flows and energy to migration. A Turkey within the
EU will still pose some challenges in these areas but there will be well-
established channels of  communication and rules for discussing and
resolving the issues that may arise in these areas. Therefore, any risk
associated with Turkish membership (including the immigration risk!)
will be easier to manage and minimise when Turkey is fully integrated
within the EU. It does not require too much imagination to see that no
government in Turkey will ever be inclined to take a cooperative
approach to EU concerns in any area (including energy, security, and
migration) should the EU decide to keep Turkey out.
In the light of  the analysis above, it is difficult to be optimistic about
the immediate future of  EU-Turkey relations. On the contrary, it
appears as if  mediocrity in European politics has combined with the
short-term opportunism of  the AKP government to create a period 
of  engineered uncertainty. This situation serves the interests of  a 
wide range of  political actors on both sides. On the Turkish side, it
enables the Euro-sceptic opposition to claim ‘victory’ against EU
interventionism and the AKP as its domestic extension. It also enables
the AKP to diffuse the nationalist claim that the government has ‘sold
out’ to the EU. On the EU side, it enables the Turkey-sceptic camp to
claim victory in its efforts to block Turkish membership while it frees the
camp in favour of  Turkish membership of  the inconvenience of  having
to make the case for the membership of  a country that is perceived to
be an awkward partner. For the time being, actors who do not benefit
from this period of  engineered uncertainty (ordinary people and
business organisations) are forced to watch the unfolding events from
the margins.
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Turkey in Europe
Trade, Investment and Migration
Professor Refik Erzan
Turkey’s economic integration with the EU can be described as more
than a common market short of  free labour mobility. The 1996
Customs Union was envisaged in the initial Association Agreement of
1963. As Turkey has opened up its capital account in 1989 and later
reformed its FDI legislation, foreign firms enjoy virtually national
treatment.17 This also effectively entails an open market in services.
Mobility of  persons, on the other hand, is severely limited by the
restrictive immigration policies and visa requirements of  the EU
countries. Nevertheless, the stock of  three million immigrants in the
EU originating from Turkey – mostly the inheritance of  the 1960s guest
worker episode – yields a significant two-way flow. Furthermore, there
are an increasing number of  EU ex-patriots in Turkey.
The Turkish economy demonstrated remarkable performance in the
aftermath of  the 2001 crisis and the subsequent reforms. During this
period, Turkish GDP grew at an average annual rate of  about 7
percent. The EU has provided an important anchor in this process.
The decision to start membership negotiations in December 2004 and
the implementation of  this decision in October 2005 boosted the FDI
inflow.
The purpose of  this essay is to highlight the scope of  EU-Turkey
bilateral economic relations, specifically in trade, investment and
migration, to underline the interdependencies involved.
Trade
The EU is by far Turkey’s biggest trading partner, accounting for nearly
half  of  its international trade. The Customs Union in 1996 with the EU
for manufactured goods has increased the openness of  the Turkish
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17 The 2003 FDI law guarantees treatment of foreign investors as national investors,
abolishes the minimum capital limits, grants full convertibility in transfers of capital and earnings,
allows property ownership without limits and recognizes right to international arbitration.
economy by substantially increasing penetration ratios18 in almost all
industries. In manufacturing as a whole, this ratio has jumped in a
couple of  years from about 20% in the early 1990s to over 35%.19
Judging by the relatively stable share of  the EU in Turkey’s trade during
that transition, it was the general liberalisation effect that dominated.
Thus, the surge in trade was largely the result of  trade created rather
than diverted. The Customs Union also boosted Turkish exports.
In terms of  the EU’s external trade, Turkey ranks as the 7th largest
partner in imports after China, US, Russia, Japan, Norway and
Switzerland – with a 3.3% share, and fifth in exports after the US,
Switzerland, Russia and China – with a 4.2% share.20 These shares
have been on an increasing trend. Furthermore, in particular sectors
they are considerably larger. For example, 15% of  EU imports in
textiles and clothing and 11% of  transport equipment originate from
Turkey. Nine percent of  EU exports in iron and steel go to Turkey.
Turkey has been growing at a greater pace and its total trade has been
expanding considerably faster than the EU’s external trade.21 As a
result, the share of  EU in Turkish imports somewhat declined (from
50% in 2004 to 41% in 2007 – partially, but not entirely due to the
increase in the oil bill). Arguably, had it not been for the Customs
Union, this decline could have been greater. There was a smaller fall
in this share on the export side from 58% to 56%.
As Turkey has been getting richer and its trade openness has been
increasing at a rate several times the rate of  growth in income, its
economic ties with its non-EU neighbours have also been transforming
rapidly. Turkish exports are no longer competing, but rather
complementing her EU neighbours’ exports. Turkish firms invest in
Egypt to take advantage of  lower wages and the African market.
Turkey builds and operates airports in Georgia and uses them as local
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18 Penetration ratio is the share of imports in apparent consumption which in turn is
measured as production plus imports minus exports.
19 See, e.g. TEPAV (2007), particularly Erzan et al (2007).
20 For consistency, all trade figures since 2003 recalculated for EU 27, are from DG Trade
(2008).
21 The potential for Turkey’s further openness is explored in Dervis et al (2004).
hubs. Whether it is a ‘bridge’ or a ‘model’, in the Mediterranean and the
Black Sea basins, in the Middle East and Central Asia, Turkey is a
rising star. Turkey owes this to performance, boosted by the prospect
of  EU membership acting as an anchor.
Investment
About half  of  all firms in Turkey with foreign origins are from EU
countries. From a very low base of  less than one billion US dollars
annually, there has been a major surge in FDI inflows into Turkey,
peaking at about US$20 billion in 2007. More than two thirds of  this
flow originated from EU countries.
Outward FDI stocks from the EU in Turkey have jumped by over 220%
or nearly €23 billion during the period 2001-2006, reaching €33 billion
in 2006.22 With a further €13 billion in 2007, it is estimated that the
current figure has exceeded €50 billion.
With the recent wave of  FDI, the focus has shifted from manufacturing
to services, particularly telecommunications and finance, giving EU
firms a strong presence in a very rapidly growing market.
The aggregate rate of  return on FDI earned by EU investors in Turkey
was higher in most periods compared to the average returns in other
extra-EU countries.
From 2001 to 2006, Turkish FDI stock in the EU increased nearly four-
fold, exceeding €11 billion. Investment went mostly to the old EU-15
countries. Among the new EU members, Bulgaria and Romania were
the main recipients.
Migration
There are about three million immigrants originating from Turkey in the
EU. Under the strict rules in most EU countries, the legal inflow is
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currently limited to family formation and union. These policies deny
the mutual benefits of  appropriate labour mobility.
Europe will be facing a major labour shortage due to its ageing and
declining population23. The recent wave of  enlargement did not change
this as the newcomers’ demographic profile was not much different.
Turkey, with its young population, would make a difference in this
transition. Turkish demography offers a window of opportunity in terms
of  working age population which should be exploited by both Turkey
and the EU.
A recent study by Erzan et al on the migration potential from Turkey to
the EU observed that: ‘In the debate about Turkish EU membership
and free movement of  labour it is often overlooked that the EU cannot
exercise a zero migration policy even if  permanent safeguards were
used. Even under the currently prevailing strict regime, there is an
annual net migration from Turkey to the EU -15 in the order of  35,000
people. Any slowdown or suspension in Turkey’s accession process is
likely to lead to lower growth and higher unemployment in Turkey.
Moreover, the reform process might slow down or be partially reversed.
The consequence of  such a combination would be a drastically higher
number of  potential migrants. A considerable proportion of  them would
be finding their way into the EU – as experience has shown,
irrespective of  legal restrictions. It is thus possible that if  Turkey loses
the prospect of  membership, the EU may end up having more
immigrants than under a free movement of  labour regime with a
prosperous EU member Turkey. Moreover, the composition of  this
migration would be less conducive for the EU labour markets – and for
integration into the host societies.
The experiences of  Greece, Portugal and Spain indicate that a
successful accession period with high growth and effective
implementation of  the reforms reduces and gradually eliminates the
migration pressures. There is no a priori reason why Turkey would not
go through a similar experience.’24
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23 See, e.g. Holzmann et al (2004) for EU labour force projections.
24 Summary, Erzan et al (2006).
Conclusion
As the membership negotiations are bogged down, the Customs Union
remains the most important instrument between the EU and Turkey.
However, there is an inherent asymmetry in this. Turkey implements
the EU trade regime without taking part in the decision-making
process. Furthermore, Turkey has to abide by all the preferential and
free trade arrangements that the EU grants to third parties without
reciprocity from them. To gain reciprocity, Turkey has to negotiate
separately with each and every third country. Thus, the Customs Union
severely limits Turkey’s trade diplomacy, particularly in its
neighbourhood.
The 1996 Customs Union decision was taken by Turkey in accordance
with the Association Agreement of  1963, with the prospect of
membership of  the EU. If  that prospect fades away, this asymmetry
may not be tolerated.
The EU is searching for greater engagement in the Mediterranean and
the Black Sea basins, where Turkey is a regional power. As France has
realised in its recent Med Union initiative, Turkey’s support is essential
in this region. That support is contingent on the prospect of  Turkish
membership of  the EU being continued.
The recent jump in the level of  FDI to Turkey accompanying the
membership negotiations demonstrates the actual business potential
in Turkey for EU firms. The future of  these flows will also depend on
Turkey’s EU membership prospects being maintained.
The pressure for immigration from Turkey is closely related to political
stability and economic prosperity within the country. A high growth
scenario for Turkey – for which the EU anchor is crucial – is the best
guarantee against any massive outward population movements.
Failure on these counts has in many previous cases proven how
porous Turkey’s borders can be.
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Turkey in Europe
EU and Turkey: In search of an almost perfect
equation
Dr Bahadir Kaleagasi (TUSIAD)
The Turkish business community supports Turkey’s EU membership
process because it is a win-win-win case: for Turkey, for the EU and for
the world.
However, the European debate on Turkey’s EU membership often
deviates from its two main axes – European values and the EU’s future
– towards a web of  emotional or secondary arguments based on
identity, geography and religion.
Turkey’s initial membership application was received, which confirms
its qualification as a European State, with the unambiguous reference
to its membership of  the Council of  Europe. Following this, all the
relevant EU institutions also approved her candidacy. After several
turbulent periods, the membership process finally reached the stage of
accession negotiations in 2005, during the British presidency of  the
European Union. By this point however, it had become clear that this
would still be a “long and narrow road” as the popular Turkish poet Asik
Veysel had defined the human life.
Public mood
In recent years, many leading European politicians, from Gordon
Brown and David Cameron to Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, and 
from Silvio Berlusconi and Kostas Karamanlis to Günter Verheugen,
Carl Bildt and Javier Solana, have repeatedly stressed how important
Turkey’s contribution will be to the European Union’s evolution as a
global actor. Many other politicians, including Nicholas Sarkozy,
expressed views hostile not only to Turkey’s European prospects, but
which also acted to provoke a certain Turcophobia in their country.
Back in Turkey, the public has understandably been more sensitive 
to the negative voices than the positive ones. An increasingly 
Euro-sceptical mood with nationalist emissions has been the corollary
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of  this trend. The Turkish public’s deep frustration over the 
EU’s inability to keep its promises on Cyprus had already severely
damaged the formerly commanding position of  pro-European trends in
Turkey.
The EU first asked Turkey explicitly to adopt its own policy in
supporting the UN peace initiative in Cyprus, ‘or else’. Turkey did
support this plan; Cypriot Turks voted ‘yes’ for peace, for reunification
and for Europe. But the last minute change of  mind by the Greek
Cypriot government resulted in a non-vote in the southern part of  the
island and in the accession to the EU of  a divided country.
The EU then said ‘sorry’ to Turkey. Brussels asked Ankara to treat
Cyprus as an EU member but without worrying about the Turkish
Cypriots’ destiny since an EU law was in preparation to put an end to
the isolation of  this community who had done nothing wrong other than
taken for granted the EU’s capacity to respect its commitments.
However, once again the EU failed to keep its promises and the Greek
Cypriot government vetoed this EU draft regulation.
Consequently, Turkey found itself  in a trap, which benefited anti-
European and anti-democratic voices in Turkey, whose best friends
have been Mr Papadopulos and the promoters of  demagogy on
Turkey’s European vocation. It would be premature though, to pass
final judgments, since history teaches us that politicians change quite
frequently as does public opinion.
Accession equation
The legitimate efforts to escape the emotional outbursts and increase
the degree of  rationality in Europe’s ‘Turkey debate’ are often
expressed by European politicians or analysts in relatively simple
terms:
“A Turkey which will fulfil the criteria of  membership will bring the EU
to the critical size that it needs to be to face the global challenges of
the 21st century”.
In deconstructing this statement, we find three major elements of  the
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equation that will allow the enlargement of  the EU’s economic,
regulatory, political and security areas to Turkey:
• Firstly, the candidate country, Turkey itself  has to be ready. This
means broadly more in terms of democracy, economic growth, social
development and legislative harmonisation, and less in terms of  
the potential problems resulting from accession. The Turkish
government’s detailed action plan adopted in April 2007 offers a
realistic road map in this respect. It requires the enhanced
implementation of  democratic reforms, an extensive mobilisation 
of  the bureaucracy, openness to consultation of  the major stake-
holders from civic society, business and social life, and a sustainable
communication strategy, both at the national and European 
levels.
• Secondly, the EU itself  ought be ready to attain a better degree of
economic competitiveness and growth, succeed in institutional
reforms, enhance political cohesion among members, and preserve
the universalism and the credibility of  the European democratic
ideals. These are Turkey’s conditions for opting to become a full EU
member.
• Thirdly, and probably most importantly, the international context will
continue to justify an enlarged European single market and effective
political unity on the world scene.
A Turkey which will be ready for EU membership, is expected to
contribute to the future success of  the European project in several
dimensions:
• Turkey’s young, vibrant, rapidly emerging and geo-strategically well-
located market will strengthen the European single market’s global
competitiveness in the face of  the emerging Asia-Pacific economic
zone. It will also help and revitalise the transatlantic relationship.
• As in the case of  the EU-Turkey Customs Union, further integration
will be a net generator of  jobs in the EU’s largest national economies,
such as the UK, Germany and France.
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• The strategic location of  Turkey will secure alternative European
energy sources and supply routes and will be an asset for the
Union’s common foreign policy.
• A rapidly emerging entrepreneurial market and information society in
Turkey will benefit Europe and the Lisbon agenda.
• The vacuity of  the ‘clash of civilizations’ scenarios will be highlighted,
as the Pope’s recent visit to Turkey illustrated how relevant Turkey’s
constructive role might be in the post 9/11 world.
• Turkey’s cooperation will greatly enhance the EU system of  internal
security against organised crime, illegal immigration and terrorism,
as well as Europe’s security policies in the Middle East, Russia,
Central Asia and beyond.
Over the next decade, the Turkish governments’ major challenges and
thus priorities for the business community will be:
• To enhance democratic stability in better implementing the EU
reforms.
• To reform the public service to make it more efficient, transparent
and accountable.
• To adopt the country’s economic governance to the requirements of
post-September 2008 global shocks: credibility, confidence, rapid-
reaction capacity and international communication ability.
• To maintain economic growth and job creation as a sustainable long-
term trend.
• To implement the EU legislative harmonisation programme with
political leadership, discipline and transparency.
• To reduce the informal economy.
• To boost agricultural productivity and rural development.
• And to introduce a comprehensive reform of  the educational system.
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TUSIAD will closely monitor the government’s policies and actions with
the aim of  leading Turkey towards better global competitiveness and a
more integrated European future.
Economic road ahead
The global financial crisis may finally trigger an “it’s the economy
stupid” momentum in Europe’s Turkey debate. Assuming that within
less than a decade we will have an EU that is economically, and thus
socially more self-confident and institutionally more efficient, rationality
may eventually and sufficiently prevail. In this respect, today’s major
economic trends will shape the framework of  the accession
negotiations.
When in early 2008 Turkey had entered into a phase of  political turmoil
over the closure case of  the ruling AK Party by the Constitutional
Court, the Turkish economic system had the chance to prove its
stability and relative independence from the political crises in Ankara.
Over the past five years, Turkey has scored a cumulative growth of
about 35%. Most of  this phenomenal growth is attributable to
productivity increases. Turkey has generated 1.2 million jobs in 2006-
2007. The speedy integration of  the Turkish economy with European
as well as global markets also put tremendous pressure on inefficient
firms, small retailers and uncompetitive businesses. But as was
predicted by many analyses of the Turkish economy published in 2004,
the industrial sector successfully carried the burden of  growth with
modernisation and capital investment as well as the Customs Union
with the EU since 1996.
Privatisation revenues in 2006 exceeded 20 billion euros and the mess
in the financial sector has been almost thoroughly cleaned up. Turkey’s
exports grew by 54% over the same period. Imports have similarly
grown by about 104%. Needless to say, as a major trading partner of
the EU, this growth performance means more trade and jobs in EU
member countries. In 2006, the share of  industrial products in Turkey’s
exports have reached 90%. These are mostly automotive, electronics,
household appliances, textiles, etc.
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This is basic data that most political decision-makers in Europe do not
know about Turkey, let alone the average European citizen. Much of
the economy is no longer agricultural but there are still structural
problems linked with the rural economy. The size of  Turkey’s workforce
engaged in agriculture is no longer above 50 per cent, as it was in
1989, but is less than 30 per cent. Agriculture’s share of  GDP is below
10% and, to re-emphasise, more than 90% of  Turkish exports are
industrial goods. The rural workforce of  over 10 million people is larger
than the population of  several EU member states and their income
levels are far below even the average for Turkey. Making the shift away
from traditional agriculture and into modern economic activity requires
enormous and prolonged structural reforms, but also it represents a
window of  new market opportunities for the EU.
With more than 60 percent of  the population under the age of  35, the
domestic market has great potential for growth; its labour force is hard
working and cost-effective; and its unique location gives it access to
Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East. More than 6,000 foreign
companies have invested in Turkey. The government has, among other
measures, decided to cut income and corporate taxes in order to
attract more than 12 billion euros of  foreign investment over the next
three years. The Turkish economy is clearly modernising much faster
than anyone expected a generation ago. It has now attained a scale
whereby it is a very significant trading partner for other European
countries. The accession process is expected to increase FDI inflows
to Turkey. Meanwhile, the boom in tourism continues with over 20
million visitors per year, although this is still well below the country’s
huge potential in this sector.
Another piece of  recent good news is the steady increase in the
registration of  patents, designs and trademarks. As a result of  the
accession process to the European Union, Turkey has made major
advances in intellectual property law. Representatives of  the Turkish
ICT sector claim to have transformed Turkey into a European
technology production and services hub.
Turkey has definitely become the most vibrant, attractive, innovative
and ‘trendy’ emerging market in and around Europe. With an average
growth rate of  4-7 percent projected for the next 10 years, Turkey is
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expected to attain fifty percent of  the EU’s average per capita income
by 2015–2017. This is also now the target period to complete the
journey in the orbit of  membership.
49
Kaleagasi
Turkey: Trade and EU Accession
Sir Julian Horn-Smith
For the past two years, I have had the privilege of  chairing the UK side
of  the Turkish British Business Council (TBBC), a high-level, private
sector-led grouping which meets every six months to review and
promote trade and investment opportunities between the UK and
Turkey. My interest in Turkey stemmed from my former position as
Deputy Chief  Executive of  Vodafone when I led Vodafone’s entry into
the Turkish market and its US$4.2bn acquisition of  Telsim.
I therefore strongly welcomed the House of  Commons Business and
Enterprise Committee’s recent positive report, “Keeping the door wide
open: Turkey and EU accession”. I gave evidence on behalf  of  the
TBBC to the Committee last April. There are indeed enormous
opportunities for increasing UK trade and investment in Turkey, and
many of  these are linked to the process of  Turkey’s application to join
the European Union.
Despite the political turbulence earlier this year, investors have
benefited from a much improved business environment in Turkey. The
government has persevered with efforts to reform the economy with
IMF and EU support.  Tremendous progress has been made since the
2001 banking crisis, and Turkey is now a major global player, as
demonstrated by the level of  foreign direct investment it attracted in
2007. The on-going process of  adapting legal and regulatory
standards to EU criteria is also a comfort to investors.
Turkey is not a traditional market for the UK, and perhaps not the
easiest one for a first-time exporter.  But the excellent political relations
between the UK and Turkey, the progress of  economic reform, and
Turkey’s strategic position as a stepping stone to other regional
markets make it an attractive proposition, and one that UK plc has not
devoted sufficient attention to.
Over the last two years, the Turkish British Business Council has tried
with minimal resources both to highlight some of  the opportunities for
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greater UK engagement, as well as bringing to the attention of  the
Turkish authorities some of  the challenges faced by existing UK
investors. 
We have been encouraged by the commitment of  the current
government and the new Turkish Investment Support and Promotion
Agency in improving the business environment in response to
investors’ concerns. This remains work in progress, and the Business
Council will continue to add value where it can. In areas such as
corporate governance, regulatory frameworks and public/private
partnerships, there is much experience that the UK can usefully share
with our Turkish counterparts. There are also major opportunities to
help raise technical and vocational training capacity, and to respond to
environmental sector upgrading where UK technology and expertise is
greatly needed.
I remain concerned that compared to our major European partners,
UK exporters to Turkey have been under-performing. This is despite
some very major UK investors such as Tesco, BAT and BC Partners
having recently moved into the Turkish market through acquisitions. At
our last meeting of  the Business Council in Istanbul, we were briefed
on forthcoming projects, including privatisation plans for maritime ports
and transport, where there are good opportunities for the UK to
engage.
The role of  the Business Council is to add value to the government-to-
government relationship, and to ensure that the voice of  business is
loudly heard. I am personally convinced that Turkey’s EU accession
process is a “win-win” situation for business. UK Plc can and should
increase its share of  this strategic and high-growth emerging market,
provided we all pull together. The Council will therefore be looking both
to business and government to support and engage with our activities
over the coming months. There is much we can do together.
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Turkey and the EU: the Business Case for
Membership
Roland Rudd
There are few issues more important for the future of  Europe and the
international community than Turkey’s relationship with the European
Union. Of  course, the country has been an associate member of  the
EU and its predecessors since 1964, but a landmark occurred in
October 2005 when the EU rightly opened accession negotiations with
Turkey.
The issue has split Europe. Many in the UK, particularly politicians 
and the business community, have been supportive of  Turkey’s
membership, and the accession talks were launched as a result of  the
British government’s push in 2005. On the other hand, British public
opinion appears less enthusiastic. Elsewhere, in Europe’s corridors of
power, leaders have been less keen than British politicians. French
President Nicolas Sarkozy has been outspoken in his opposition to
Turkey’s full membership, as has Angela Merkel, the German
Chancellor (although the German Foreign Minister, the Social
Democrat, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, has argued for Turkish accession).
Their reservations are surpassed by other member states such as
Austria, which tried to block the accession talks, and where the climate
of  opinion on Turkish accession is implacably against.
While there are many opponents of  Turkish membership across
continental Europe, British political opinion is strongly supportive.
There are not many issues which unite the three major parties, but this
is one. As a business-based organisation, Business for New Europe
believes it very important that this cross-party support holds, and
sends the right signals to the British people and civil society, as well as
other national governments across the EU. It is true that British public
opinion has become increasingly lukewarm towards Turkish
membership. Whereas once there was a clear majority in favour of
Turkish membership, now the public seems far more equivocal. A 2006
poll showed 42% of  the British public supporting EU membership for
Turkey, with 39% opposed (Eurobarometer, Attitudes towards
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European Union enlargement, July 2006). In a climate of  rising
concern about migration, this is perhaps not a surprise.
Of  all the constituencies in the UK, the most steady in its support for
Turkish accession has been the business community. British-based
companies have experienced first-hand the benefits of  cross-border
trading and investment. They point to the success of  previous EU
enlargement for economic growth and productivity. They see that a
larger European market, already the largest in the world worth an
estimated $17.6 trillion, would provide more opportunities. Polling
commissioned by Business for New Europe from May this year shows
67% of  British business leaders think that Turkey should be allowed to
become a member of  the EU if  it can meet the same requirements as
other new member states, with only 22% disagreeing.25
The lesson of  previous enlargements is encouraging. Before the 
2004 enlargement, which brought in ten new member states to the 
EU fold, many argued that it was the wrong decision. Some affirmed it
was too early to admit a number of  former Communist states to the EU,
while others claimed that the EU should remain a club of  Western
European states. Yet the enlargement of  2004 has been a spectacular
success. The new member states have galvanised the EU. Their
membership has been of  benefit to themselves, but also to established
member states and to the Union a whole. It has reunited Eastern and
Western Europe, creating new commercial and consumer opportunities
for people everywhere. Business now has access to an enlarged
market of  500 million people. The markets of  Eastern Europe are
growing at a much higher rate than the EU average, and have provided
very useful pools of  labour for the British and other economies. With
their burgeoning growth and skilled labour, these markets are not
merely emerging – they have emerged.
Of course there are some serious obstacles to EU membership, but
many of  these will be addressed by the reform process initiated by
accession. There are several reasons why BNE is committed to Turkish
accession. First, the move would boost the EU’s single market, by at
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least 70 million people (Turkey’s population is projected to grow from
70 million today to 85 million in 2030). It is true that since 1995 there
has been a Customs Union between Turkey and the EU, which
abolished barriers to trade in goods. Therefore significant trading links
have already built up: the EU is Turkey’s biggest trading partner, being
responsible for 42% of  Turkish imports and 52% of  its exports. The
move to a fully-fledged single market encompassing Turkey would be
a significant further step, moving from trade in industrial goods to free
trade in services, capital and labour.
Second, EU membership will advance foreign investment, and help
British companies with investments in Turkey. The last three years 
have seen a huge upsurge in foreign direct investment (FDI), coinciding
with the beginning of accession talks in 2005. Annual FDI was $1 billion
or less until 2004 but by 2006 it had increased to a staggering $20
billion. Of the 15000 foreign companies that have invested in Turkey,
the majority come from EU countries. In this context, Britain has
become a significant investor in Turkey. There are over 400 British
companies operating in Turkey, including some very large companies
such as Vodafone and Aviva. The UK government has rightly identified
Turkey as one of  17 markets on the UKTI High Growth Markets
Programme. Foreign investors have been attracted to Turkey by its
dynamic domestic economy and other factors such as its location 
and relatively low labour costs. Certainly the accession process has
helped with investor confidence, and EU membership would
consolidate these economic and investment ties.  As President Barroso
said in his address to the National Assembly in Ankara in April 2008:
“Economic interdependence is another important force in EU-Turkey
relations. The European Union is by far Turkey’s main trading partner.
Trade with the EU represents 50% of Turkey’s trade volume and Turkey
is the EU’s 7th trading partner, before Canada and India for example.
Today, 80% of  the inward investment coming into Turkey comes from
the European Union. This implies that thousands of  jobs in Europe and
in Turkey today, depend on our relationship continuing to grow”.26
Third, the EU can tap into Turkey’s rapidly advancing economy. Its
rapid economic growth of  around 7% per annum has made it the sixth
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largest economy in the EU. A study by PricewaterhouseCoopers
forecasts that in the years up to 2050, Turkey’s average annual per
capita GDP growth would be 3.4% which compares positively with the
projected rate of  1.9% for the G7 group of  countries. A specific trend
that illustrates Turkey’s rapid economic growth is the increase in GSM
users from 15 million in 2003 to 58 million in 2007. The economy has
been reforming, including moves to make the central bank independent
and a privatisation programme of  state-owned companies. Of  course
the progress in recent years is likely to be slowed down by the credit
crunch and prevailing global economic gloom. Like nearly every
national economy, Turkey’s economy is likely to see slower growth, and
will be adversely affected by the dip in the European economy, on
which it is so dependent.
Fourth, Turkish membership of  the EU would also have consequences
for the European labour market. With an average age of  29 and 
65% of  the population below 34 years of  age, Turkey has a
disproportionately young population, which offers exciting economic
opportunities in the future. Turkish migrants to the UK and other
member states could be timely, considering the demographics of  the
European continent, which has a low birth rate and an ageing
population. While many Turks would be likely to move to Mediterranean
countries for climate and cultural reasons, Turkish migrants to the UK
could help fill low-skill jobs and public sector jobs but also highly-skilled
posts too.
Fifth, Turkey’s is in an important strategic position, as a gateway to the
energy rich Middle East. As an example, the delayed Nabucco pipeline
project will transport gas from Azerbaijan to Austria via Turkey and
other EU member states. As the Centre for European Reform has
argued: “[Turkey] could add to the EU’s energy security by acting as a
bridge to the resource-rich regions in its neighbourhood. Turkey’s
development as a European energy hub seems natural, given its
location between countries that harbour 70 per cent of  the world’s oil
and gas reserve to its east, north and south, and one of  the world’s
biggest energy markets in the West”.27
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If  Turkey is to join the European Union, an important series of  reforms
need to take place, including those to its judicial system. However,
clearly this will not happen overnight but there is scarcely a more
important challenge for the EU over the coming decades. We hope
that British politicians of all parties and the business community remain
committed to the goal of  Turkish accession.
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Turkey and EU Energy Security
Gareth Winrow
Increasingly concerned over issues of  energy security, EU officials 
are repeatedly urging that Europe should diversify both its sources 
of  energy and the routes along which this energy is delivered.
Particular attention is focused on natural gas imports, given the
anticipated declining production of  natural gas in Europe. In 
the immediate aftermath of  the Russian-Georgian conflict in August
2008, the alarm has been raised that Europe is in danger of  becoming
too dependent on natural gas imports from an increasingly
emboldened and assertive Russia – although, as noted in the
conclusion, one may seriously question whether Russia would actually
threaten to suspend gas deliveries to Europe. According to Eurostat,
the EU’s statistical office, in 2006, EU member states received 33% of
their crude oil imports and 40% of  their natural gas imports from
Russia.28
In contrast to crude oil, gas is still mostly delivered by pipeline to 
fixed customers in a regional rather than global market. Unlike 
crude oil, natural gas projects are planned well ahead and supply
contracts concluded in advance. In the natural gas trade there 
are much closer ties binding the supplier with the consumer. Aware 
of  these issues, and Europe’s concerns, policy-makers in Ankara are
arguing that Turkey can become a crucially important energy hub
through which new sources of  energy, including natural gas, may be
delivered to Europe along routes which will bypass Russia.
Energy security and Turkey’s strategic location
In a paper published in 2004, it was noted that Turkey lay adjacent to
states or regions possessing 71.8% of the world’s proven gas reserves
and 72.7% of  the world’s proven oil reserves. The paper added that as
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many as ten gas-producing states, holding over 35% of  global proven
gas reserves, had or would be expected to have an interest in
channelling their exports to Europe via Turkey.29
Hydrocarbons produced in the Caspian region, the Gulf  and North
Africa could be transported to Europe across Turkish territory. Ankara’s
close and warming relations with states in these regions could create
a more peaceful and stable environment which would encourage
energy companies and banks to invest in new pipeline projects. For
example, Turkish officials are promoting an initiative known as the
Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform, and within the
framework of  this, are exploring the possibilities for normalising their
relations with Armenia. In a recent interview with Newsweek, Turkey’s
President Abdullah Gul, noting how the Caucasus are important for
energy resources and for the transportation of  energy eastwards to
Europe via Turkey, argued that Turkey was seeking to promote stability
in the area in order to create the right climate for economic
cooperation.30
New pipelines running through Turkish territory could also help Turkey
to diversify its sources of  energy and become less dependent on
Russia for natural gas imports. An insignificant gas producer itself, in
2007 Turkey imported approximately 36.5 billion cubic metres (bcm) of
gas to meet its rapidly growing energy needs, of  which over 23 bcm
originated from Russia.31 In spite of  the impressive rapprochement
between Ankara and Moscow in recent years, reflected in expanding
economic ties and the substantial numbers of  Russian tourists flocking
to Turkey’s beaches, Turkish policy-makers are wary of  becoming over-
dependent on Russia to satisfy their energy needs. The interests of
Turkey and Russia in the wider Black Sea region could clash in 
the future, for instance over Nagorno-Karabakh or the Crimea. On the
other hand, Gazprom’s enthusiasm to gain more access to Turkey’s
58
Turkey in Europe
29 John Roberts, “The Turkish Gate: Energy Transit and Security Issues,” Centre for European
Policy Studies, EU-Turkey Working Papers, no.11, October 2004, p.1.
30 Rana Foroohar, “The Last Word – Pulled from Two Directions,” Newsweek, 13 October
2008 at http://www.newsweek.com/id/162306
31 See the section on Natural Gas Trade on the website of the Turkish Petroleum Pipeline
Corporation (BOTAS) at http://www.botas.gov.tr
market, with regard to the privatisation of  natural gas grids and the
development of  natural gas storage facilities, could give Turkey some
leverage in its negotiations with Russia.
Turkey: energy hub or energy transit state?
An energy transit state merely collects revenues for the transportation
of  hydrocarbons across its territory. An energy hub is perceived as
much more prestigious and involves more economic and social
benefits. It usually refers to a central market place where, in addition
to pipelines, storage facilities, refineries, terminals, petrochemical units
and other energy-related businesses may be located which offer jobs
and boost the local economy. Officials in Ankara repeatedly emphasise
how Turkey is becoming a crucial energy hub with the Turkish
Mediterranean port of  Ceyhan, for example, destined to become a new
Rotterdam, with new docking ports and enlarged storage units.32 Given
its strategic location, it is argued by Turkish policy-makers that, as an
energy hub, Turkey would enable the EU to enhance its energy security
by diversifying the sources and routes of  energy imports.
Concerning crude oil, Ceyhan is becoming a key port through which
increasing volumes are transported to outside markets in Europe. In
addition to Iraqi crude, oil from Azerbaijan is now exported to EU
member states via the port after the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC)
pipeline became operational in May 2006. The BTC, with a current
annual capacity of  50 million tons (mt), was the first major oil pipeline
in the region to be constructed which bypassed Russia. If  Kazakh
decision-makers abide by their commitment to provide the BTC in
future with crude from their oil fields, the long-term profitability of  the
pipeline would be ensured.
Much less clear, though, is the future of  the planned 50-70 mt/y
capacity $1.5-2 billion Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline which would
connect Turkey’s Black Sea and Mediterranean coasts. A much-
publicised ceremony for laying the foundation stone for this pipeline
was held in April 2007 and a $35 million feasibility study was
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completed the following November. However, hitherto, there is no
throughput guarantee for this pipeline. Turkish energy officials had
been led to believe that Kazakhstan, and also Russia, would provide
volumes to fill the pipeline, but Moscow has since thrown its weight
behind the alternative Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline project which
would connect the Bulgarian Black Sea coast with the Greek Aegean
coast. Russian policy-makers have been pressing their Kazakh
counterparts to commit volumes to this alternative project. Ankara is
attempting to win over Moscow by including the Samsun-Ceyhan oil
pipeline in a package which would also entail the extension of  the Blue
Stream pipeline (which delivers Russian natural gas to Samsun) to
Ceyhan to enable gas to be delivered to Israel. Moscow could also be
attracted by the possibility that certain amounts of  crude transported
along the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline could be carried to markets in India
via a pipeline connection running to and then across Israel to the Red
Sea. The Turkish Energy Market Regulatory Authority has also granted
a license to the Calik Energy Group and the Indian Oil Corporation to
construct a new refinery at Ceyhan. If  realised, the Samsun-Ceyhan
pipeline project would enable Turkey to become an energy hub for the
delivery of  further amounts of  Russian, as well as Kazakh crude, to
European and other markets.
Regarding natural gas, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline has been
carrying gas to Turkey since July 2007 from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz
field in the Caspian Sea. It could carry as much as 30 bcm/y when the
Shah Deniz project moves into its later stages of  development. The
Turkey-Greece Interconnector pipeline was opened in November 2007
and currently delivers small volumes of  Azerbaijani natural gas to the
Greek market. There are plans to extend this pipeline to Italy so that
eventually 3 bcm/y of  natural gas will be conveyed to Greece and a
further 8.5 bcm/y to Italian consumers. Much more ambitious is the
projected Nabucco pipeline which would carry 31 bcm/y to Europe via
a pipeline running through Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and
Austria. A consortium of  six companies, including BOTAS (the Turkish
Petroleum Pipeline Corporation), has been established to develop
Nabucco, which has been given priority status by the EU. However, this
€7.9 billion project has encountered delays, in part because of
Ankara’s insistence that it should not merely be a transit state,
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collecting revenues for the movement of  this substantial volume of
natural gas across its territory.
Turkish energy officials have been insisting that 15% of  the gas
transported on Nabucco should be allocated to Turkey at a low price.
This could enable Turkish consumers to be less dependent in future on
Russian natural gas imports. In addition, these officials are pressing for
Turkey to have the right to re-sell the remaining gas volumes at a higher
price to markets downstream33.
European consumers, however, want to buy the gas directly from the
supplier. Ankara here appears to be acting against the principles of
the energy acquis and the EU-sponsored Energy Community Treaty
with regard to transit issues and the development of  an integrated
energy market. Turkey, though, has refused to ratify the Energy
Community Treaty and has not been able to open the energy chapter
in its EU accession negotiations. In early October 2008, Mihaly Bayer,
the special envoy appointed by the Hungarian authorities to promote
Nabucco, declared that Turkey’s demands risked holding up the
signing of  intergovernmental agreements on the pipeline and
jeopardised the financial feasibility of  the project34. Earlier in February,
Jozias van Aartsen, the EU’s coordinator for natural gas projects in
southern Europe, had warned that Turkey’s position concerning
Nabucco would demonstrate what sort of  future relationship Turkey
wanted with the EU35.
Clearly, Turkish energy officials need to quickly back down and realise
that acting as a transit state for the transportation of  natural gas in the
specific case of  Nabucco would not run counter to Turkey’s ambitions
to be an energy hub for the movement, storage and processing of
hydrocarbons more generally. Indeed, there are reports that the Turkish
Ministry of  Foreign Affairs has been attempting to persuade their
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colleagues at the Energy Ministry to adopt a more flexible position with
regard to Nabucco36.
The EU also has a role to play. Indications that the energy chapter
would soon be opened in accession talks with Turkey would put
pressure on Ankara to ratify the Energy Community Treaty and
assume a less rigid stance over Nabucco. France had been hoping to
open this chapter in the period of  its EU Presidency, but Cyprus has
continued to block the start of  talks because Ankara has opposed
Cypriot plans to drill for oil offshore within its territorial waters. But,
signs of  possible movement in negotiations between the Turkish
Cypriots and the new President of  the Republic of  Cyprus, Demetris
Christofias, could result in Nicosia allowing Ankara and Brussels to
open the energy chapter.
Nabucco vs South Stream
It is imperative that the issues of  pricing and transit with regard to
Nabucco are swiftly resolved with Ankara, bearing in mind that Moscow
is promoting a rival natural gas project known as South Stream. This
latter scheme, co-sponsored by Gazprom and the Italian energy
company ENI, would entail the construction of  a $20 billion, 30 bcm/y
pipeline running under the Black Sea to Bulgaria. One branch would
then transport gas to Greece and Italy, and another branch would cross
central Europe to Austria. Both Nabucco and South Stream are
competing to secure access to natural gas from the Caspian region. In
the case of  South Stream, gas deliveries from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to the Russian market would enable
Gazprom to release volumes of  Russian gas to fill South Stream.
Given this competition with South Stream, it is unclear if  enough gas
will be accessed to help fill Nabucco in the foreseeable future.
According to the current timetable, Nabucco will become operational
in 2013 when 8 bcm will flow along the pipe. After 2018, it is envisaged
that over 30 bcm/y should be transported on the Nabucco pipeline.
Turkey could play an important role in helping to fill Nabucco.
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Moscow has offered to pay European prices to ensure that future
natural gas production in Azerbaijan is directed to the Russian market.
Ankara can exploit its excellent relations with Baku to convince the
Azerbaijani authorities to hold to their commitment to provide 8 bcm/y
of  natural gas to cover the initial phase of  operations of  Nabucco.
Much more problematic will be the possible transportation of  Kazakh
and Turkmen natural gas along Nabucco. Citing ostensible
environmental concerns, and noting that the legal status of  the
Caspian Sea has still to be determined, both Moscow and Tehran are
opposed to the laying of  pipelines across the length of  the Caspian
Sea. Russia has promised to pay market prices for future Caspian gas
deliveries, and is aiming to upgrade and expand the pipeline network
in Central Asia. However, Turkey could encourage the Turkmens to
transport gas to Nabucco. Turkmenistan’s Livanov-Barinova-Lam (LBL)
gas structures in the Caspian Sea could be connected by a 60km
pipeline to Azerbaijan’s Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli (ACG) gas fields. From
there, Turkmen gas could be hooked up to Nabucco. This would not
entail the laying of  a pipeline across the length of  the Caspian Sea. In
April 2008, the Turkmen authorities had pledged to Brussels that they
would deliver 10 bcm/y to European markets from 2009 onwards.
Turkmen and Azerbaijani gas fields will only be connected if  Baku and
Ashgabat can resolve their dispute over the ownership of  the disputed
Kyapaz/Serdar gas field, which lies between the LBL and ACG
structures. Enjoying close relations with both governments, Ankara
could use its good offices to help the contending parties come to an
agreement which would most probably involve the shared ownership
of  the disputed field. It appears that the Turkish government has been
attempting to mediate since late 2007 and this could lead to positive
results in the near future37.
Natural gas from Iran, Iraq, Egypt and even Russia could also be
carried to Europe via Turkey along Nabucco. In July 2007, Turkish and
Iranian officials agreed to a memorandum of  understanding which
involved plans for Turkey to invest $3.5 billion to develop three blocks
in the South Pars gas field in Iraq which could produce over 20 bcm/y.
This gas could be delivered to Turkey in a planned $2 billion, 30-40
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bcm/y pipeline which could be hooked up to Nabucco. This pipeline
could carry 10 bcm/y of  natural gas from Turkmenistan, although the
Turkmen authorities have yet to commit themselves to this project. This
scheme has still to develop, in part because of  problems between the
Turks and Iranians over the terms concerning production and
operation. Suspicious of  Iran’s nuclear energy ambitions, the Bush
administration has repeatedly and vehemently insisted that Iranian gas
should not be carried on the Nabucco pipeline, and this has compelled
the Europeans to backtrack. At a press conference in Vienna in
September 2008, Zsolt Hernadi, the CEO of  the Hungarian energy
company MOL, announced that Nabucco would only become a reality
if  Iranian natural gas was carried along the pipeline38.
But without definite safeguards satisfactory to the US on the issue of
Iranian nuclear energy, it is exceedingly unlikely that European
companies, facing the threat of  economic sanctions, would support
Iran’s participation in Nabucco. This is in spite of  Turkey’s backing for
Iran’s inclusion in the project. More promising are the prospects for
carrying possibly up to 10 bcm/y of  Iraqi natural gas on Nabucco via
a pipeline connecting the Akkas field in Anbar province in northern Iraq
to Turkey. Ankara is very supportive of  this project, though there have
been delays in opening the tender in Iraq, in part it seems because of
Baghdad’s delay in passing a petroleum law. The Egyptians have
agreed to deliver to Europe 2 bcm/y of  natural gas via the Arab Gas
Pipeline and Nabucco. Construction work has been delayed, though,
on the Syrian-Turkish stretch of  the Arab Gas Pipeline, in spite of
Ankara’s strong backing for the completion of  this pipeline. On a visit
to Moscow in February 2008, Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan
reiterated Ankara’s interest in involving Russia in Nabucco39.
This would run counter to the EU’s immediate concern to become less
dependent on Russian natural gas imports. In practice, it is unlikely
that Gazprom will commit volumes to Nabucco given Moscow’s
sponsorship of  the rival South Stream project.
64
Turkey in Europe
38 Vladimir Socor, “Hungary eyes Iranian Gas in efforts to resuscitate Nabucco,” Eurasia
Daily Monitor, Vol.5, no.187, 30 September 2008.
39 “FM Babacan’s Visit to Moscow,” Anatolian News Agency, Ankara, 21 February 2008.
Possible developments in the near future concerning Nabucco
Swift progress is now essential if  Nabucco is to be realised in the
foreseeable future. It is hoped that intergovernmental agreements will
be concluded before the end of  2008. These agreements would
provide a favourable tax regime and guarantees against nationalisation.
In late January 2009, a conference is scheduled to be convened in
Budapest to which shareholders in Nabucco and potential suppliers
and customers will be invited. Matters involving the financing of  the
pipeline will soon need to be resolved. Shareholders in the consortium
have agreed to provide funding, but 60-70% of  the financing will need
to be borrowed from banks. Before the recent global credit crisis, the
European Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs was confident that
the European Investment Bank would support the project40.
As previously noted, the government in Ankara must quickly reach
agreement on issues of  pricing and transit, which would satisfy
Brussels. Time is now pressing given the timetable mentioned above.
On a more positive note, there are reports that Turkey and Azerbaijan
are seriously considering inviting Armenia to participate in Nabucco. In
return, Armenia could restore to Azerbaijan five of  the seven
Azerbaijani provinces it is currently occupying around the disputed
territory of  Nagorno-Karabakh41.
Such a package may have been discussed at the tripartite meeting of
the foreign ministers of  Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia in New York
in September 2008. Armenia’s “participation” could entail the
construction of  a spur of  the gas pipeline linking Azerbaijan and Turkey
which would run through Armenia. In the event of  further conflict and
instability in Georgia, natural gas from Azerbaijan and other Caspian
states could thus still flow to Turkey and to Nabucco even if  pipelines
were damaged or forced to close down in Georgian territory.
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Conclusion
In the wake of  the Russian-Georgian conflict in August 2008, EU
member states have spoken of  the need in the immediate future to
intensify efforts to boost the security of  energy supplies, and, in this
context, diversify energy sources and supply routes42.
Obviously, given its geographical location, its relations with
neighbouring states, and actual and potential pipeline projects running
through Turkish territory, Turkey could play an increasingly key role for
the EU to meet its energy needs. However, officials in Ankara and
Brussels and in other EU member states do need to show more
flexibility over issues such as Cyprus and Nabucco.
It is important to note, though, that in spite of  recent problems the
relationship between the EU and Russia in the field of  energy remains
essentially an interdependent one and will remain so for the
foreseeable future. Energy sales to Europe provide Russia with
substantial revenues, and possible alternative markets for Russian
energy in India and China will not be realised in the near- to medium-
term. Given these circumstances, C. Boyden Gray, the US envoy for
Eurasian energy diplomacy, has recently noted that it was highly
unlikely that Russia would cut off  gas to Europe43.
The reality is that, in the longer term though, Europe will need to import
increased volumes of  natural gas from Russia, as well as from
elsewhere, as gas production in Europe declines and economies there
continue to grow. Gazprom will probably not be able to meet Europe’s
rising energy needs, given the lack of  investment in developing new
gas fields in Russia. In this situation, however, Turkey could still play an
important role for the EU with regard to the possible delivery of  larger
volumes of  natural gas from the Caspian region, the Middle East,
North Africa and the Gulf  to Europe.
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Conclusion: Making Turkish membership a reality
Adam Hug
As Dr Ugur’s contribution points out, ‘it is difficult to be optimistic about
the immediate future of  EU-Turkey relations’ but it is essential that
progressive voices in politics, business and civil society do not lose
hope and force their way in from the margins to make the case clearly
in favour of  Turkish accession.
At its core, the argument must be that if  Turkey succeeds in fully
implementing the EU’s accession criteria, which are the toughest
requirements given to any candidate country, it will have earned the
right to join the European Union. If  Turkey has undergone the massive
economic, political, social and legal transformation required, the denial
of  its right to join would be an affront to the principles of  fairness that
must underpin the EU and could lead a spurned Turkey to re-orientate
itself  away from the West, forming new alliances in the Middle East
and Central Asia to the detriment of  Europe.
On a technical matter, the Irish rejection of  the Lisbon Treaty 
means that the EU will need to find a new institutional mechanism 
to enable any further enlargement, be it to include Turkey, Croatia 
or any other country. It is essential that the resolution to this problem,
be it an Irish re-vote or a more limited set of  reforms coming out of  
the original treaty, does not undermine the accession progress of  
any country through long-term delay or place further hurdles in their
path.
The contributors to this pamphlet are clear that Turkey must accelerate
the pace of  the economic and political reforms necessary for
accession to take place, improving the quality of  life in Turkey, and
strengthening support for membership, both among Turks and EU
citizens. Turkey must also reach out to EU citizens with effective public
diplomacy, busting myths and raising awareness of  Turkey as a
modern European society with deep roots in the continent’s history.
These steps must reciprocated within the EU through cultural
exchange and use of  economic links to break down barriers.
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Turkey must not be used as a ‘whipping boy’ by unpopular
governments to distract from their own problems, as the price for the
future of  Europe is simply too high. European politicians have started
the process of  accession and they must commit to letting the process
run its course. The huge commitments Turkey is making cannot be
allowed to be undermined by ‘low politics’ in European capitals.
This pamphlet has argued that the business community has an
important role to play in standing up for Turkey and this must include
leadership at the European level. While recognising the challenges 
it faces as a federation with members of  differing views,
BusinessEurope must come off  the fence and show leadership on
behalf  of  the European business community in making the case for
membership, provided Turkey meets the accession criteria, a position
held by its trade union counterpart, the ETUC. European companies
operating in Turkey should take the lead in educating their workforces
about the country and show the benefits that closer co-operation with
it can bring. Similarly Europe’s trade unions can play a proactive role
in informing their members and dampening fears over Turkish
migration negatively affecting employment.
Failure to grant Turkish accession could be one of  the greatest
strategic mistakes the EU could inflict upon itself, one that would be
hugely harmful to business and undermine European prosperity and
security. The path to accession is challenging for both the EU and
Turkey, but advocates of  an open and progressive Europe need to
stand up and make the case that it is a challenge that we must not fail
to meet.
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